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U.P.C.,INC. d/b/a
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RULE 24(i) RESPONSE TO R.O.A.'S
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES

R.O.A. GENERAL, INC. d/b/a
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
Defendant and Appellee.
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Docket No. 980280-CA
Trial Court Civil No. 960906388

Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, U.P.C., Inc. d/b/a Garco
Industrial Park responds to the supplemental authorities submitted by R.O.A. General, Inc. d/b/a
Reagan Outdoor Advertising on or about May 17, 1999. The reasons ROA gave for the
supplemental citations are not valid based on the following:
1.

Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.. 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah 1998).

ROA submitted this case on the unlawful detainer issue. The language to which ROA refers the
Court is mere dicta, and deals not with unlawful detainer but with forcible entry, a statute not
implicated in this action, dealing with issues not raised in this action. ROA is improperly seeking
to raise an entirely new issue not raised before the trial court, for the first time after the matter has
been fully briefed and argued on appeal. Therefore, the case is not a "pertinent and significant
authority" allowed under Rule 24(i), and the reason ROA gave for the supplemental citation is not
valid.
2.

Murray City Zoning Ordinance §17,68.160.C and Salt Lake County Ordinance

§ 19.82.100. ROA submitted these ordinances on the issue whether ROA may have violated Utah's

antitrust law and thereby interfered with Garco's prospective econ >•

relations by an improper

means. ROA has never argued that a "county/municipality action doctrine" exception to state
antitrust liability has ever been adopted by any state, or should be adopted hv flu slate of Utah,
either before the trial court, in its Appellee's Brief or during oral argument before this Court. 1
Because Ri )A lias not argued the issue, Garco has had no opportunity to respond to any argument
ROA might have raised. Whether such an exception to Utah antitrusi law exists is not before the
Court on appeal. Therefore, the ordinances are not "pertinent and significant authorities" allowed
under Rule 24(i), and the reason ROA gave for the supplemental citations is not valid.
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UPC, dba Garco Industrial Park v. ROA General, dba Reagan Outdoor
Advertising; Case No. 980280-CA

Dear Clerk:
The above-referenced matter is scheduled for oral argument tomorrow, May 18, 1999
at 9:30 a.m. Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following
pertinent and significant authorities have come to the attention of Reagan Outdoor
Advertising with regard to the above-referenced matter.
1.
Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.. 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah
1998). The Court's discussion at page 108 pertains to the unlawful detainer issue discussed
at pages 28 and 29 of Garco's Opening Brief, pages 46 and 47 of Reagan's Brief, and page
15 of Garco's Reply Brief. This citation came to Reagan's attention as a result of arguments
made by Garco in its Reply Brief regarding the unlawful detainer issue.
2.
Murray City Zoning Ordinance, § 17.68.160.C and Salt Lake County
Ordinance § 19.82.100. These supplemental citations pertain to the assertion made by
Garco, for the first time on appeal, on p. 11 of its Reply Brief that a state anti-trust claim is
pending against Reagan and that no county or city ordinances would be at issue such that a

Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
May 17, 1999
Page 2
"County/Municipality Action Doctrine" could immunize actions performed under county or
city ordinances.
These supplemental citations came to Reagan's attention in preparation for oral
argument.

Sincerely,

Leslie Van Frank
LVF/db
Enclosures
cc:
F. Mark Hansen (via hand-delivery)
F \LESLIE\MAY99\GARCO-LT WPD

ZONING
ORDINANCE

Murray City • •

17.68.160

17.68.160
Off-premise signs.
Except where otherwise prohibited by this chapter, off-premise signs may be erected and maintained in commercial and manufacturing zones subject to. the following conditions:
A. Size.
1. Freeway Orientation. The maximum size of
an off-premise sign located within 300 feet of 1-15
or 1-215 in the C-D and M-G zones shall be 672
square feet in area exclusive of temporary cut-outs;
2. Non-Freeway Orientation. In the C-N\ C-D
and M-G zones, off-premise signs located over 300
feet distance from 1-15 and 1-215 shall not exceed
300 square feet in area.
B. Pole Support. All off-premise signs shall be
of mono-pole (single support structure) design and
construction.
C. Separation. A minimum of 500 feet radial
spacing from any other off-premise advertising sign.
D. Setback. No part of any sign may be located
nearer than two feet to any property line or right-ofway.
E. The maximum height limit for off-premise
signs is as follows:
1. In the C-D and M-G zone (freeway oriented):
35 feet above freeway grade or ground level whichever is greater;
2. In the C-N, C-D and M-G zones (non-freeway oriented): 35 feet above ground level.
F. Clearance. The minimum sign clearance from
grade to the bottom of the sign is eight feet. (Ord.
906 § 3.07)

A. Electronic message centers are not allowed
off-premise.
B. All electronic message centers must have an
automatic dimmer to reduce sign intensity after
dark.
C. Lamp size may not exceed 54 watts of incandescent lighting for day time usage. An automatic dimmer must be installed to reduce nighttime
wattage to 30 watts. Light emitting diodes and magnetic discs may be used, if the light intensity is not
greater than that produced by incandescent lighting.
D. An electronic message center may not flash
or scintillate, except to change the displayed wording to different wording.
E. Any display on the electronic message center
must remain lighted for at least two seconds.
F. An electronic message center located within
500 feet of a residential area, or as otherwise determined by the planning commission, may not operate
between the hours of ten p.m. and six a.m. of the
following day.
G. A minimum of five percent of the time the
sign is in use the message shall be devoted to public
service messages. (Ord. 906 § 3.09)
17.68-190
Sexually oriented business signs.
Sexually oriented business signs are limited as
follows:
A. No more than one sign is allowed per business;
B. No sign may exceed 18 square feet in area;
C. No animation is permitted on or around any
sexually oriented business sign or on the exterior
walls or roof of the business premises;
D. No descriptive art or designs depicting any
activity related to or implying, the nature of the
business is allowed. Signs may contain alphanumeric copy only;
E. Only single face wall signs are permitted;
F. Other than the signs specifically allowed by
this ordinance, a sexually oriented business may not
use any temporary sign, banner, light or other device designed or intended to draw attention to the
business location. (Ord. 906 § 3.10)

P.68.170
Floodplain.
As approved by the planning commission by
conditional use permit. (Ord. 906 § 3.08)
17.68.180
Electronic message centers.
Electronic message centers require conditional
use permit approval in the C-D and M-G zones. In
addition to the restrictions found in this chapter and
the other chapters which apply to the zones mentioned above, electronic message centers are subject
to the following restrictions:

428
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B. A service sign located within the clear view
of an intersection shall not exceed two feet in
height. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19.82.080
Size computation.
A. The following shall be used when calculating
sign sizes: When more than one use occupies a lot,
the frontage may be used to calculate the sign size
for one total ground or projecting sign, not for each
use. The total may then be divided between the
uses. There may be any number of flat or wall
signs, provided their total does not exceed the percentage of wall area coverage allowed.
B. A property line which abuts a nonaccess
freeway, road, street or right-of-way may not be
used in computing sign area. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part),
1988)

19.82.120
Signs on public property.
No sign shall be located on publicly owned land
or inside street rights-of-way except signs required
and erected by permission of an authorized public
agency. Signs shall include, but not be limited to,
handbills, posters, advertisements or notices that are
fastened, placed, posted, painted or attached in any
way upon any curbstone, lamppost, telephone pole,
telegraph pole, electric light or power pole, hydrant,
bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk or street. (Ord. 1034 §
1 (part), 1988)

19.82.085
Height of ground signs.
The height of ground signs, except as otherwise
specified in this chapter, shall be measured from the
grade at the property line of the yard in which the
sign is located, but shall not exceed the height allowed in the zone. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19.82.130
Lighted signs.
A. A lighted sign shall not be installed which
permits the light to penetrate beyond the property in
such a manner as to annoy or interfere with the use
of adjacent properties.
B. Such lights alleged to violate subsection A of
this section by the adjacent property owners or
development services division director shall be
subject to a public hearing before the planning commission as to the validity of the alleged violation.
If such light is determined to be in violation, the
owner of the light shall take appropriate, corrective
action as directed. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19.82.090
Imprint of ownership required.
The imprint of the sign owner and sign erector of
all signs shall be in plain and public view. (Ord.
1034 § 1 (part), 1988)
19.82.100
Off-premises sign requirements.
Off-premises signs erected along the interstate or
the primary highway system as defined by the state
shall conform with the provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. (Ord. 1106 § 5, 1990: Ord.
1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19.82.140
Mobile sign.
One mobile sign may be used for each use for a
period of sixty days following the issuance of a
permit to construct a permanent sign for that use.
Upon inspection and approval of the permanent
sign, or upon expiration of the sixty-day period,
whichever first occurs, the mobile sign must be
removed. Mobile signs may not employ animation,
flashing lights or intermittent lights. (Ord. 1034 §
1 (part), 1988)

19.82.110
Visibility at intersections.
A. There shall be a minimum clearance of ten
feet between the ground and any part of a projecting
sign or ground sign, as measured from the grade of
the intersecting streets and located within the clear
view of an intersection, which is a triangular area
formed by the street property lines and a line connecting them at points forty feet from the intersection of the street lines. Any portion of a sign structure within the clear view of an intersection and
nearer the ground than ten feet may not exceed ten
inches in width, thickness or diameter.

19.82.150
Traffic hazard prohibited.
Signs or other advertising structures shall not be
erected at the intersection of any streets or driveways in such manner as to obstruct free and clear
689

(Salt Lake Count> 2-98)
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Dr. Clyde B. KELLER, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
SOUTHWOOD NORTH MEDICAL PAVILION, INC., a Utah corporation, and
Dr. Robert L. Youngblood, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 970090.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 28, 1998.
Commercial lessee sued lessor for trespass, conversion, and interference with prospective business advantage, after lessor removed from a business monument signs
identifying lessee's business, and lessee's trial brief raised the additional statutory claim
of forcible entn*. Following a trial, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Division I, Anne M. Stirba, J., entered judgment
for lessee and awarded treble damages as to
the forcible entn* claim. Lessor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that: (1) the parties tried the forcible entn'
claim by implied consent; (2) defendant
waived defenses that were not raised in responsive pleadings; and (3) lessee's interest
in the signs was a 'license," not a 'lease/'
and thus, lessee's interest was not protected
by the forcible entry statute.
Judgment modified to exclude treble
damages.
Russon, J., concurred in the result and
filed an opinion.
1. Pleading 0=427
Party may give implied consent to try
issue not raised by the pleadings when party
does not object to the introduction of evidence at trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
2. Pleading 0 4 2 7
Fact that plaintiff did not move to
amend the pleadings to include his forcible
entry claim did not make the trial court's
consideration of the claim inappropriate,
where claim was tried by implied consent of

3. Appeal and Error e=>949
Appellate court reviews for correctness
trial court's application of civil procedure rule
allowing issues not raised in pleadings to be
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
4. Appeal and Error 0 9 4 9
Appellate court grants trial court fairly
broad measure of discretion in determining
under given set of facts whether parties have
given implied consent to try issues not raised
in pleadings, as such determination is highly
fact intensive. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
5. Pleading 0=>427
Evidence supported finding that the parties, by implied consent, tried plaintiffs statutory forcible entn claim which was not
raised in pleadings; defendant made no objection before or during trial to presentation
of evidence related to forcible entn' issue,
both parties substantively addressed the issue in their trial briefs, and both parties
addressed the issue again during closing argument. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et seq.; Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
6. Forcible Entn and Detainer <5=>25(1)
Defendant waives defense that plaintiff
failed to comply with statutory indorsement
requirement for forcible entry claim if defendant fails to raise the defense in a responsive
pleading or by motion before submitting a
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-8;
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h).
7. Landlord and Tenant 0=>291(7)
Party waived statute of limitations defense to statutory forcible entn' claim by
failing to raise the defense in a responsive
pleading or by motion before submitting a
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et
seq.; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h).
8. Landlord and Tenant c=»291(7)
Assuming that one-year limitations period applied to statutory forcible entry claim,
plaintiffs claim was timely, though claim was
not raised in plaintiffs timely initial pleading
and more than one year elapsed between the
alleged forcible entn and plaintiffs first
mention of the claim, as claim was tried by

KELLER v. SOUTHWOOD . \ U K i n m ^ , V n a j

M. - -

Cite as 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998)

implied consent of parties and thus related
back to initial pleading. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1
et seq.; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b, c).
9. Pleading c=>255.1
Defendant, who expressly waived certain
defenses in a post-trial hearing, could not use
civil procedure rule permitting amendment of
pleadings to revive those defenses. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rules 12(h), 15(a).
10. Landlord and Tenant C=>20
Licenses 0=^44(2)
A 'lease" conveys an interest in land and
transfers possession, and thus must convey a
definite space and transfer exclusive possession of that space to the lessee, while a
''license" in real property is the permission
or authority to engage in a particular act or
series of acts upon the land of another without possessing an interest therein, and is
thus subject to the management and control
retained by the owner.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

11. Landlord and Tenant c=>20

13. Forcible Entry and Detainer e=>l
A sign is not "real property," for purposes of forcible entry statute governing entry upon or into real property, though the
sign is affixed to a structure on real property, as a sign is not a type of property that
people can occupy. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1,
2).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

14. Landlord and Tenant C=*275
At common law, a landlord could use
self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's premises
and evict the tenant without running the risk
of incurring civil liability.
15. Forcible Entry and Detainer O l
Forcible entry statute protects only
types of property that people can occupy.
U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 2;.

Vincent C. Rampton. Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Harold G. Christensen, Ryan E. Tibbitts,
Paul M. Halliday, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

Licenses C=>44(2)
In determining whether an instrument
creates a lease or a license, the intention of
the parties as ascertained from the instrument itself prevails, but a court is not bound
by the parties' characterization of their
transaction or by any title they may have
given a writing.

ZIMMERMAN, Justice.

Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.,
and Dr. Robert L. Youngblood (collectively,
"Youngblood") appeal a trial court award of
treble damages against them and in favor of
Dr. Clyde B. Keller. Keller brought an action against Youngblood for trespass, conversion, and interference with prospective busi12. Landlord and Tenant <>39, 287.1
ness advantage after Youngblood removed
Lease agreement for commercial prem- two signs owned by Keller from a business
ises gave lessee a 'license," rather than a monument. Keller also argued that Young"lease," as to signs identifying lessee's busi- blood violated Utah's forcible entry statute.
ness on a business monument, and thus, forc- The trial court found that Youngblood's reible entry statute, which protected only real moval of the signs violated the forcible entry
property interests, did not protect lessee as statute and awarded Keller treble damages
to lessor's unauthorized removal of the signs; under that statute. See Utah Code §§78lease agreement did not transfer possession 36-1 & -10. On appeal, Youngblood argues
of any part of the monument to lessee, assign that the trial court erred in finding for Keller
an
y definite space to him, or give him exclu- on his forcible entry claim because Keller
d e possession of any space on the monu- failed to plead forcible entry in his complaint,
men
t, but instead simply gave him permis- failed to comply with the statute's requireon to place two signs on the monument, ments, and failed to bring his claim within
U.C.A
IQSO no o/? i / i ^
.i
_._^_. *
,. - . „ . . . . . _
. i
•C-A1953,
78-36-1(1, 2).
the statute's one-year limitations period.
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Youngblood also argues that Keller's access
to signage space did not constitute real property and therefore was not covered by the
forcible entry statute and argues that the
trial court erred in awarding treble damages.
We modify the ruling to exclude the treble
damages award.
We first review the facts before turning to
the standard of review and our analysis. In
June of 1991, Keller leased office space from
WCJD, Ltd. ("WCJD"), to house his chiropractic business. The space leased was in
Southwood Plaza-South, an office building
that, together with Southwood Plaza-North,
forms the Southwood Medical Pavilion and
Plaza ("Medical Pavilion") in Sandy, Utah.
The Medical Pavilion has a large monument
facing the street. Under the terms of their
leases. Medical Pavilion tenants could place
signs, typically small brass plaques, on this
monument to advertise their services. The
standard lease WCJD used for SouthwoodPlaza tenants, including Keller, provided that
each tenant could put a sign on the monument but that all signs had to "be in keeping
with other signs" as to size and location.1
Keller, however, wanted a larger sign than
the other tenants because he did not have an
established practice in the area. WCJD
agreed to allow him to place a 30-inch by 60inch sign on each side of the monument,
subject to WCJD's approval of the signs.
Keller agreed to pay WCJD an additional
$50 per month for this privilege. Keller and
WCJD memorialized this agreement in an
addendum to their lease agreement.2 WCJD
later approved Keller's signs, which were
affixed to the monument with construction
adhesive.
1.

Paragraph 12 of the WCJD Lease provided:
ERECTIOS ASD RE\iO\AL
OF SIGNS
Tenant may place suitable signs on the Premises for the purpose of indicating the nature of
the business carried on by Tenant m the Premises; provided however, that the location and
size of such signs shall be in keeping with
other signs in the Building where Premises are
located
Tenant shall remove such signs at
the expiration ot thi* Lease or earlier termination thereof and repair am damage to the
Premises caused bv buch removal.

2.

The addendum provided in pertinent part.

In June of 1992, WCJD conveyed its interest in the Southwood Plaza-North building
and property, including the monument, to
Valley Bank* & Trust. In October of 1992,
Valley Bank & Trust conveyed this property
to Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., a
corporation Dr. Youngblood formed for the
purpose of owning and managing this property. WCJD retained title to Southwood Plaza-South.
Shortly after the conveyance, Youngblood
spoke to Keller about his signs. Youngblood
told Keller that his signs were "unprofessional" and that they should be removed. At this
time, Youngblood was unaware of the addendum to Keller's lease addressing the signs,
and Keller was unaware that Youngblood's
corporation owned the property on which the
monument sits. Keller did not remove the
signs.
Approximately fourteen months later.
Youngblood removed the two signs during
daylight hours and in Keller's absence but
without permission from or notice to Keller.
Keller objected, and after attempts to resolve
the problem failed, he relocated his practice
to another building.
Keller then fried suit against Youngblood
and his corporation, alleging trespass, conversion, and interference with prospective
business advantage. On June 18, 1996, Keller submitted a trial brief addressing these
issues. Two days later, Keller submitted a
supplemental trial brief, asserting for the
first time that Youngblood had violated the
forcible entry statute. On June 24. 1996,
Youngblood submitted his trial brief, addressing the merits of Keller's forcible entry
claim as well as the three original claims.
Youngblood did not object to the late asserC. Owner agrees to allow tenant to install
at tenant's own expense and risk, two 30 inch
bv 60 inch fiat, non-electric signs, one on each
side of the front monument.
(a) The signs shall not interfere with am
existing signs alreadv in place.
(b) The signs must conform to any and all
State or Local code or regulation. An>
problems or costs shall be the Tenant's sole
risk and expense.
(c) The design and copv of signs must meet
with owners written approval
(d) Tenant agrees to pax an additional
$50.00 per month for this sign space.

Cite as 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998)

tion of the forcible entry claim as outside the
pleadings, nor did he assert a statute of
limitations defense or argue that Keller
failed to comply with the forcible entry statute's requirements.

time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues.

of limitations barred recovery, and (iv) Keller's access to signage space did not constitute "real property" within the meaning of
the forcible entry statute. We address each
question in turn.

[2] In applying rule 15Ho), the trial court
should assess whether the parties tried an
issue by express or implied consent. See
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah
Ct.App.1987). Once the court concludes that
the parties did, the court must treat the
issues in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. See Zions First
Natl Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irr., Inc., 795
P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990); Pouhen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983).3

Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b). "A finding of implied
consent 'depends on whether the parties recThe trial court found that YoungbloocPs ognized that an issue not presented by the
actions constituted trespass, conversion, in- pleadings entered the case at trial.'" Doterference with prospective business advan- mar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining
tage, and forcible entry, and awarded Keller Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1986) (quotactual and punitive damages. At the close of ing Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel GRANADA 652
trial, Keller reminded the court that under F.2d 415 (5th Cir.1981)). A party may give
the forcible entry statute, he was entitled to implied consent when it does not object to
treble damages. The court awarded treble the introduction of evidence at trial. See
damages but allowed post-trial briefing and a General /«.s. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynashearing on the treble damages issue. Fol- ty Corp.. 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976).
lowing this hearing, the court reaffirmed its However, "[wjhen evidence is introduced that
treble damages award.
is relevant to a pleaded issue and the party
On appeal, Youngblood argues that the against whom the amendment is urged has
trial court erred in finding for Keller on the no reason to believe a new issue is being
forcible entry claim because (i) Keller failed injected into the case, that party cannot be
to plead forcible entry in his complaint, (ii) said to have impliedly consented to trial of
he failed to satisfy the statute's indorsement that issue." Domar Ocean Transp., 783 F.2d
requirements. • iil > a special one-year statute at 1188.

[1] Youngblood first claims that Keller's
failure to include the forcible entry claim in
his complaint bars any recover}' under Utah's
forcible entry statute. Keller responds that
the parties tried the claim by implied consent. Rule 15'b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure applies wThen parties try by express or implied consent issues not raised in
the pleadings. Rule 15'b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by exr ress or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any
*- The fact thai Keller did not move to amend the
Pleadings to include his forcible entry claim does
n
ot make ihe inal court's consideration of the
claim inappropriate. Rule 15(b) states that "failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of
issues [tried by express or implied
consent]." I ;ah R.Civ.P. 15(b); see also Clark v.

[3, 4] Our review of the trial court's application of rule 15(b) is a legal question that
we review for "correctness." See State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). However, because the trial court's determination
of whether the issues were tried with all
parties' "implied consent" is highly fact intensive, we grant the trial court a fairly
broad measure of discretion in making that
determination under a given set of facts. See
id. at 939.
Second Cir. Ct.t 741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987)
("[Fjailure to move to amend the pleadings to
conform to the evidence does not affect the fact
that those issues were in fact tried by the consent
of the parties and were therefore before the
court.").
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[5] We conclude that the trial court did
not err by addressing the forcible entry issue. The record contains substantial evidence indicating that Youngblood tried the
forcible entry claim by implied consent.
Youngblood made no objection before or during trial to the presentation of evidence related to the forcible entry issue, and both parties substantively addressed the issue in
their trial briefs. Importantly, Youngblood
reviewed Keller's supplemental trial brief
that outlined the forcible entry claim before
he submitted his trial brief. Instead of objecting to the claim as being outside of the
pleadings or barred by a defense, Youngblood addressed the claim on the merits.
And both parties addressed the issue again
during closing argument. Keller's attorney
stated:
[Youngblood] violated the forcible entry
statute.... We have, likewise, relied on
the proposition that the removal and destruction of the sign constituted forcible
entry. And there was a suggestion in
[defendant's trial] brief . . . that the forcible entry statute does not apply. It clearly applies. It couldn't be more apropos in
this situation.... There is a suggestion in
[defendant's trial] brief that somehow [the
statute] applies only to houses or enclosures. I don't read that in the statute and
I saw no case law for the proposition, nor
do I know of [any] anywhere else. It's
intended to apply to all leaseholds, property. This was property. It was a fixture
permanently affixed subject to a valid
leasehold.
4.

Assuming, arguendo, that a one-year limitations period applies, the statute of limitations
defense fails e\en if Youngblood did not waive it
Youngblood bases his statute of limitations defense on the fact that more than one year elapsed
between his removal of the sign and Keller's first
mention of the forcible entry claim. This argument, however, ignores the fact that rule 15(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
amended claims relate back to the date of the
original filing
Rule 15(c) provides that a claim asserted in an
amended pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading whenever the claim "arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth . . in the original pleading."
Utah
R.Civ.P. 15(c). Because the parties tried the
forcible entry claim by implied consent, Keller's

Youngblood's attorney responded by arguing
that the sign was not real property, was not
a fixture, and was not permanently attached.
Because these facts are enough to support
the conclusion that Youngblood tried the
forcible entry claim by implied consent, we
find that the court properly considered this
issue.
[6, 7] In a post-trial brief, Youngblood for
the first time argued that the one-year statute of limitations of section 78-12-29(2 >
barred the forcible entry claim and that the
court's failure to indorse on the summons the
number of days within which the defendant
must appear, as required by section 78-36-8
of the Code, precluded recovery under the
statute. We find that both of these defenses
were waived.
[8, 9] Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, "[a] party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion . , . or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply.'' Utah
R.Civ.P. 12(h). A party waives a statute of
limitations defense by failing to raise it in a
responsive pleading or by motion before submitting a responsive filing. See Staker i\
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d
1188, 1190 (Utah 1983); Utah R.Civ.P. 12(h).
Likewise, a party's failure to comply with
section 78-36-8,s indorsement requii'ement is
a waiveable defense. See Fowler v. Seiter,
838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Because Youngblood failed to raise the statute
of limitations4 and statutory compliance defenses before he submitted a response—in
this case his trial brief—he waived those
defenses.5
complaint was amended for purposes of rule 15.
Further, because the forcible entry claim arose
out of the same conduct >et forth in Keller's
original complaint, rule 15 c) applies. Accordingly, a one->ear statute of limitations would not
bar Keller's claim because the 15(b) amendment
relates back to the filing date of Keller's complaint. Because we find that Dr. Youngblood
waived the statute of limitations defense, we
need not decide whether a one-year limitations
period, in fact, applies to a forcible entry claim.
5. We recognize that rule l^: of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure can operaie as an exception to
the general rule that a party waives a defense b\
failing to raise it in a responsive filing. Under
rule 15(a), a part} ma\ amend its pleading to
assert a defense that it failed to raise in a respon-

Cite as 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998)

Because the trial court's finding of a forcMoreover, Youngblood expressly waived
these defenses during the post-trial hearing ible entry turns on its conclusion that Keller
on the treble damages issue. Youngblood's had a valid leasehold in real property, we
must first determine if a leasehold existed.
attorney stated:
After reading [plaintiffs] memorandum on This determination is a question of law that
the issue of waiver, Fm reluctantly inclined we review for correctness. See Pena, 869
to agree that, although my predecessor P.2d at 936.
counsel certainly should have objected, he
[10] A lease "conveys an interest in land
didn't. And based upon that, I do think
and
transfers possession." 49 Am.Jur.2d
that those issues, [failure to plead forcible
entry, statute of limitations, and statutory Landlord and Tenant § 21 (1995). A lease
compliance] are probably waived. And so must convey a definite space and must transfer exclusive possession of that space to the
I'm not going to contest those.
lessee. See id. In contrast, a license in real
Finding that the trial court did not err in
property "is the permission or authority to
considering the forcible entry claim and that
engage in a particular act or series of acts
Youngblood waived any defenses, we now
upon the land of another without possessing
review the trial court's application of the
an interest therein," 25 Am.Jur.2d Easeforcible entry statute to the facts. Youngments and Licenses § 137 (1996), and is
blood argues that the district court erred in
"subject to the management and control refinding a forcible entry because neither Keltained by the owner." 49 Am.Jur.2d Landler's sign nor his access to signage space
lord and Tenant § 21 (1996).
constituted real property The forcible entry
statute provides:
[11] In determining whether an instruEvery person is guilty of a forcible entry, ment creates a lease or a license, "the intenwho either:
tion of the parties as ascertained from the
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or instrument itself prevails. Id. However, a
other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimi- court is not bound by the parties' characterdation or stealth, or by any kind of vio- ization of their transaction or by any title
lence or circumstances of terror, enters they may have given a writing. 25 Am.
upon or into real property; or,
Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 137 (1996).
(2) after entering peaceably upon real
[12] We find that the lease agreement
property, turns out by force, threats or
and
the addendum gave Keller a license, not
menacing conduct the party in actual posa
leasehold
interest. First, under paragraph
session.
12 of his lease, Keller, like all other tenants,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-1 (emphasis addhad permission to place a sign on the monued). The district court made three conclument. Paragraph 12 did not transfer possessions of law pertinent to the "real property"
sion of any part of the monument to Keller,
issue. It ruled that the monument was real
did not assign any definite space to him, and
property because it "was permanently affixed
did not give him exclusive possession of any
to real property"; that Keller's lease gave
space on the monument. Further, WCJD
him "a valid and enforceable leasehold interretained management and control of the
est" m the monument; and that Keller's
monument under paragraph 12.
lease rights in the monument "constituted a
leasehold m realty." The district court then
The addendum covering Keller's signs did
concluded that Youngblood committed a forc- nothing to convert this license into a leaseible entry "in that [he] forcibly deprived hold. Instead, the addendum merely altered
Plaintiff of peaceable possession of his lease- paragraph 12's requirement that tenants
hold by self-help."
could only place signs that were "in keeping
Slv

e pleading if the part\ has lea\e of the court or
consent of the adverse part\ See Stakei v Huntl
*&on Cle\ eland In Co 664 P 2d 1188, 1190
vutah 1983) However because Youngblood ex-

pressK waived his defenses in the post-trial hearing, he cannot avail himself of rule 15 to revive
his defense
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with other signs" on the monument. That is,
the addendum gave Keller a license to place
a larger sign on the monument.
[13] For the benefit of the bench and
bar, we think it useful to address whether
the forcible entry statute would apply if Keller had had a valid leasehold interest. In
other words, is a sign affixed to a structure
on real property the type of property intended to be covered by the forcible entry statute? To understand the type of property
covered by the forcible entry statute, we
briefly review its history.
[14,15] At common law, a landlord could
use self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's
premises and evict the tenant without running the risk of incurring civil liability. See
Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way
Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative
to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 759,
776 (1994). After realizing the potential for
violence that this rule of law created when a
landlord used self-help to expel a tenant,
many states passed forcible entry and detainer statutes.6 Id. Addressing the constitutionality of Oregon's forcible entry statute,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
The landlord-tenant relationship was one
of the few areas where the right to selfhelp was recognized by the common law of
most States, and the implementation of
this right has been fraught with "violence
and quarrels and bloodshed." . . . Hence,
the Oregon statute was enacted in 1866 to
alter the common law and obviate resort to
self-help and violence. The statute, intended to protect tenants as well as landlords, provided a speedy, judicially supervised proceeding to settle the possessory
issue in a peaceful manner.
Lindsey v. Kormet, 405 U.S. 56, 71-72, 92
S.Ct 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); see also
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903,
906 (1935) (noting that purpose of forcible
6.

Before institution of forcible entry statutes, English common law permitted one entitled to possession of land to use any force reasonably necessary—short of force threatening death or serious
bodily injun-—to regain possession from another
wrongfully withholding the land. In 1381, England, under Richard II, passed a statute criminal-

entry statute is "to provide a speedy remedy,
summary in character, to obtain possession
of real property" and thereby prevent those
seeking possession from taking "the law into
their own hands"). Forcible entry statutes
were designed primarily to help landlords
and tenants settle disputes regarding possession and occupancy of real property. See
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d
100, 105 (1944) (Larson, J., concurring) (stating that forcible entry statute "has to do with
actions to obtain possession, or protect one in
retaining his occupancy of real property"
(emphasis added)). Thus, we conclude that
the forcible entry statute only protects types
of property that people can occupy. A sign
is not this type of real property, and therefore, the forcible entry statute does not apply
in this situation.
We hold that the trial court incorrectly
concluded Keller had a leasehold interest in
real property. Because Keller had no interest in real property, the trial erred in applying the forcible entry statute.
Judgment modified to exclude treble damages.
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C.J.,
and BRYNER, Judge, concur in Justice
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
RUSSON, Justice, concurring in the
result:
I write separately only to express my disapproval of the majority's advisory opinion.
After concluding that the agreement and addendum gave Keller a license, not a leasehold
interest, the majority states, "For the benefit
of the bench and bar, we think it useful to
address whether the forcible entry statute
would apply if Keller had had a valid leasehold interest." Because no leasehold interest
exists in this case, the issue as to whether
the forcible entry statute applies to leasehold
interests is not ripe for review. I see no
reason to depart from our sound judicial
izing the use of force to regain possession of
land. In 1840, the statute was held to provide a
basis for civil liability. See Gerchick, supra, at
773-75. In 1872, Utah adopted a forcible entn
statute modeled after the English statute. See
Compiled Laws of Utah ch. 8, § 1196 (1872).

Cite as 959 P.2d 109 (Utah 1998)

•olicy against rendering advisory opinions.
lee Stewart v. Utah Public Sew. Comm%
585 P.2d 759, 784-35 (Utah 1994) (Howe, J.,
dissenting) C'[I]t is not the province of this
court 'to exercise the delicate power of pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases'
such as the one now before us." (quoting
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah
1980))); Olson v. Salt Lake City School DisU
724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) ("This
court will not issue advisory- opinions.");
Justheim v Division of State Lands, 659
P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1983) (where question
is not ripe for adjudication, court's function is
not to render advisory opinions); Black v.
Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Utah
1982) ("Judicial policy dictates against our
rendering an advisory opinion."); Merhish v.
H.A. Folsom & Assoc, 646 P.2d 731, 732
(Utah 1982) (u[S]trong judicial policy against
issuing advisory opinions dictates that courts
refrain from adjudicating moot questions.");
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 94 P.2d
414, 424 (1939) (refusing to address constitutionality of statute where determination not
relevant to party's rights).
Having disqualified himself, Justice StewTart does not participate herein; District
Judge Bryce K. Bryner sat.

ing lot. The District Court, Fifth District,
Cedar City Department, J. Philip Eves, J.,
found store liable and awarded punitive damages. Store appealed after its motion for
judgment notwithstanding verdict wras denied. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.,
held that patron's failure to introduce evidence of store's relative wealth was not fatal
to award of punitive damages.
Affirmed.
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion in
which Howe, J., concurred.

1. Appeal and Error c=>237(5)
Judgment <3=>199(5)
Ordinarily, failure to make motion for a
directed verdict forecloses consideration of
later motion for judgment notwithstanding
verdict and any appellate review of sufficiency of evidence to support verdict.
2. Appeal and Error e=>863, 934(1)
Supreme Court will reverse trial court's
denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict based on insufficient evidence to
support verdict only if, viewing evidence in
light most favorable to party who prevailed,
it concludes that evidence is insufficient to
support verdict.
3. Appeal and Error <S=>863

Desiree HALL, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.; Larry D.
Moss, individually; Does I-X and Roe
Corporations I-X, inclusive, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 970014.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 12, 1998.
Patron sued store for negligence after
he was struck by vehicle in store's icy park-

8

In order to prevail, party appealing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding
verdict must marshal evidence in support of
verdict and then demonstrate that evidence
is insufficient when viewed in light most favorable to verdict.
4. Damages @=*184
Introduction of evidence as to store's
relative wealth was not a technical prerequisite to an award of punitive damages in patron's negligence action against store to recover for injuries sustained when she was
struck by automobile in store's icy parking
lot, wiiere store did not challenge awrard on
basis of excessiveness.
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HAND DELIVERED
Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, # 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

UPC, dba Garco Industrial Park v. ROA General, dba Reagan Outdoor
Advertising; Case No. 980280-CA

Dear Clerk:
The above-referenced matter is scheduled for oral argument tomorrow. May 18, 1999
at 9:30 a.m. Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following
pertinent and significant authorities have come to the attention of Reagan Outdoor
Advertising with regard to the above-referenced matter.
1.
Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion. Inc.. 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah
1998). The Court's discussion at page 108 pertains to the unlawful detainer issue discussed
at pages 28 and 29 of Garco's Opening Brief, pages 46 and 47 of Reagan's Brief, and page
15 of Garco's Reply Brief. This citation came to Reagan's attention as a result of arguments
made by Garco in its Reply Brief regarding the unlawful detainer issue.
2.
Murray City Zoning Ordinance, § 17.68.160.C and Salt Lake County
Ordinance § 19.82.100. These supplemental citations pertain to the assertion made by
Garco, for the first time on appeal, on p. 11 of its Reply Brief that a state anti-trust claim is
pending against Reagan and that no county or city ordinances would be at issue such that a

Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
May 17, 1999
Page 2
"County/Municipality Action Doctrine" could immunize actions performed under county or
city ordinances.
These supplemental citations came to Reagan's attention in preparation for oral
argument.

Sincerely,

Leslie Van Frank
LVF/db
Enclosures
cc:
F. Mark Hansen (via hand-delivery)
F:\LESLIE\MAY99\GARCO-LT.WPD

ZONING
ORDINANCE

Murray City

17.68.160

17.68.160
Off-premise signs.
Except where otherwise prohibited by this chapter, off-premise signs may be erected and maintained in commercial and manufacturing zones subject to. the following conditions:
A. Size.
1. Freeway Orientation. The maximum size of
an off-premise sign located within 300 feet of 1-15
or 1-215 in the C-D and M-G zones shall be 672
square feet in area exclusive of temporary cut-outs;
2. Non-Freeway Orientation. In the C-N, C-D
and M-G zones, off-premise signs located over 300
feet distance from 1-15 and 1-215 shall not exceed
300 square feet in area.
B. Pole Support. All off-premise signs shall be
of mono-pole (single support structure) design and
construction.
C. Separation. A minimum of 500 feet radial
spacing from any other off-premise advertising sign.
D. Setback. No part of any sign may be located
nearer than two feet to any property line or right-ofway.
E. The maximum height limit for off-premise
signs is as follows:
1. In the C-D and M-G zone (freeway oriented):
35 feet above freeway grade or ground level whichever is greater;
2. In the C-N\ C-D and M-G zones (non-freeway oriented): 35 feet above ground level.
F. Clearance. The minimum sign clearance from
grade to the bottom of the sign is eight feet, (Ord.
906 § 3.07)

A. Electronic message centers are not allowed
off-premise.
B. All electronic message centers must have an
automatic dimmer to reduce sign intensity after
dark.
C. Lamp size may not exceed 54 watts of incandescent lighting for day time usage. An automatic dimmer must be installed to reduce nighttime
wattage to 30 watts. Light emitting diodes and magnetic discs may be used, if the light intensity is not
greater than that produced by incandescent lighting.
D. An electronic message center may not flash
or scintillate, except to change the displayed wording to different wording.
E. Any display on the electronic message center
must remain lighted for at least two seconds.
F. An electronic message center located within
500 feet of a residential area, or as otherwise determined by the planning commission, may not operate
between the hours of ten p.m. and six a.m. of the
following day.
G. A minimum of five percent of the time the
sign is in use the message shall be devoted to public
service messages. (Ord. 906 § 3.09)
17.68.190
Sexually oriented business signsSexually oriented business signs are limited as
follows:
A. No more than one sign is allowed per business;
B. No sign may exceed 18 square feet in area;
C. No animation is permitted on or around any
sexually oriented business sign or on the exterior
walls or roof of the business premises;
D. No descriptive art or designs depicting any
activity related to or implying, the nature of the
business is allowed. Signs may contain alphanumeric copy only;
E. Only single face wall signs are permitted;
F. Other than the signs specifically allowed by
this ordinance, a sexually oriented business may not
use any temporary sign, banner, light or other device designed or intended to draw attention to the
business location. (Ord. 906 § 3.10)

17.68.170
Floodplain.
As approved by the planning commission by
conditional use permit. (Ord. 906 § 3.08)
17.68.180
Electronic message centers.
Electronic message centers require conditional
use permit approval in the C-D and M-G zones. In
addition to the restnctions found in this chapter and
the other chapters which apply to the zones mentioned above, electronic message centers are subject
to the following restnctions:
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19,82.080
Size computation.
A. The following shall be used when calculating
sign sizes: When more than one use occupies a lot,
the frontage may be used to calculate the sign size
for one total ground or projecting sign, not for each
use. The total may then be divided between the
uses. There may be any number of flat or wall
signs, provided their total does not exceed the percentage of wall area coverage allowed.
B. A property line which abuts a nonaccess
freeway, road, street or right-of-way may not be
used in computing sign area. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part),
1988)

B. A service sign located within the clear view
of an intersection shall not exceed two feet in
height. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988)
19.82.120
Signs on public property.
No sign shall be located on publicly owned land
or inside street rights-of-way except signs required
and erected by permission of an authorized public
agency. Signs shall include, but not be limited to,
handbills, posters, advertisements or notices that are
fastened, placed, posted, painted or attached in any
way upon any curbstone, lamppost, telephone pole,
telegraph pole, electric light or power pole, hydrant,
bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk or street. (Ord. 1034 §
1 (part), 1988)

19,82.085
Height of ground signs.
The height of ground signs, except as otherwise
specified in this chapter, shall be measured from the
grade at the property line of the yard in which the
sign is located, but shall not exceed the height allowed in the zone. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19.82.130
Lighted signs.
A. A lighted sign shall not be installed which
permits the light to penetrate beyond the property in
such a manner as to annoy or interfere with the use
of adjacent properties.
B. Such lights alleged to violate subsection A of
this section by the adjacent property owners or
development services division director shall be
subject to a public hearing before the planning commission as to the validity of the alleged violation.
If such light is determined to be in violation, the
owner of the light shall take appropriate, corrective
action as directed. (Ord. 1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19,82.090
Imprint of ownership required.
The imprint of the sign owner and sign erector of
all signs shall be in plain and public view. (Ord.
1034 § 1 (part), 1988)
19,82.100
Off-premises sign requirements.
Off-premises signs erected along the interstate or
ths primary highway system as defined by the state
shall conform with the provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. (Ord. 1106 § 5, 1990: Ord.
1034 § 1 (part), 1988)

19.82.140
Mobile sign.
One mobile sign may be used for each use for a
period of sixty days following the issuance of a
permit to construct a permanent sign for that use.
Upon inspection and approval of the permanent
sign, or upon expiration of the sixty-day period,
Whichever first occurs, the mobile sign must be
Removed. Mobile signs may not employ animation,
flashing lights or intermittent lights. (Ord. 1034 §
1 (part), 1988)

19,82.110
Visibility at intersections.
A. There shall be a minimum clearance of ten
&£t between tfte ground ancf any part of a projecting
sign or ground sign, as measured from the grade of
the, intersecting streets and located within the clear
vie,w of an intersection, which is a triangular area
formed by the street property lines and a line connecting them at points forty feet from the intersection of the street lines. Any portion of a sign structure within the clear view of an intersection and
ne<*rer the ground than ten feet may not exceed ten
inches in width, thickness or diameter.

19.82.150
Traffic hazard prohibited.
Signs or other advertising structures shall not be
erected at the intersection of any streets or driveWays in such manner as to obstruct free and clear
689
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Dr. Clyde B. KELLER, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
SOUTHWOOD NORTH MEDICAL PAVILION, INC., a Utah corporation, and
Dr. Robert L. Youngblood, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 970090.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 28, 199S.
Commercial lessee sued lessor for trespass, conversion, and interference with prospective business advantage, after lessor removed from a business monument signs
identifying lessee's business, and lessee's trial brief raised the additional statutory claim
of forcible entry. Following a trial, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Division I, Anne M. Stirba, J., entered judgment
for lessee and awarded treble damages as to
the forcible entry claim. Lessor appealed.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that: (1) the parties tried the forcible entry
claim by implied consent; (2) defendant
waived defenses that were not raised in responsive pleadings; and (3) lessee's interest
in the signs was a "license," not a "lease,"
and thus, lessee's interest was not protected
by the forcible entry statute.
Judgment modified to exclude treble
damages.
Russon, J., concurred in the result and
filed an opinion.
1. Pleading 0=427
Party may give implied consent to try
issue not raised by the pleadings when party
does not object to the introduction of evidence at trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
2. Pleading 0 4 2 7
Fact that plaintiff did not move to
amend the pleadings to include his forcible
entry claim did not make the trial court's
consideration of the claim inappropriate,
where claim was tned by implied consent of

3. Appeal and Error 0^949
Appellate court reviews for correctness
trial court's application of civil procedure rule
allowing issues not raised in pleadings to be
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
4. Appeal and Error C^>949
Appellate court grants trial court fairly
broad measure of discretion in determining
under given set of facts whether parties have
given implied consent to try issues not raised
in pleadings, as such determination is highly
fact intensive. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
5. Pleading <5=>427
Evidence supported finding that the parties, by implied consent, tried plaintiffs statutory forcible entry claim which was not
raised in pleadings: defendant made no objection before or during trial to presentation
of evidence related to forcible entry issue,
both parties substantively addressed the issue in their trial briefs, and both parties
addressed the issue again during closing argument. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et seq.; Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(b).
6. Forcible Entry and Detainer @=>25(1)
Defendant waives defense that plaintiff
failed to comply with statutory indorsement
requirement for forcible entry claim if defendant fails to raise the defense in a responsive
pleading or by motion before submitting a
responsive filing.
U.C.A.1953, 78-36-8;
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h).
7. Landlord and Tenant o=>291(7)
Party waived statute of limitations defense to statutory forcible entry claim by
failing to raise the defense in a responsive
pleading or by motion before submitting a
responsive filing. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 et
seq.; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(h).
8. Landlord and Tenant 0291(7)
Assuming that one-year limitations period applied to statutory forcible entry claim,
plaintiffs claim was timely, though claim was
not raised in plaintiffs timely initial pleading
and more than one year elapsed between the
alleged forcible entry and plaintiffs first
mention of the claim, as claim was tried bv

Cite as 959 P.2d 102 (Utah 1998)

implied consent of parties and thus related
back to initial pleading. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1
et seq.; Rules CivJProc, Rule 15(b, c).
9. Pleading c=>255.1
Defendant, who expressly waived certain
defenses in a post-trial hearing, could not use
civil procedure rule permitting amendment of
pleadings to revive those defenses. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rules 12(h), 15(a).
10. Landlord and Tenant C=>20
Licenses 044(2)
A 'lease" conveys an interest in land and
transfers possession, and thus must convey a
definite space and transfer exclusive possession of that space to the lessee, while a
"license" in real property is the permission
or authority to engage in a particular act or
series of acts upon the land of another without possessing an interest therein, and is
thus subject to the management and control
retained by the owner.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

11. Landlord and Tenant c=>20

13. Forcible Entry and Detainer e=>l
A sign is not "real property," for purposes of forcible entry statute governing entry upon or into real property, though the
sign is affixed to a structure on real property, as a sign is not a type of property that
people can occupy. U.CA1953, 78-36-1(1,
2).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

14. Landlord and Tenant 0 2 7 5
At common law, a landlord could use
self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's premises
and evict the tenant without running the risk
of incurring civil liability.
15. Forcible Entry and Detainer C=>1
Forcible entry statute protects only
types of property that people can occupy.
U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 2i.

Vincent C. Rampton, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Harold G. Christensen, Ryan E. Tibbitts,
Paul M. Halliday, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

Licenses C^44(2)
In determining whether an instrument
creates a lease or a license, the intention of
the parties as ascertained from the instrument itself prevails, but a court is not bound
by the parties' characterization of their
transaction or by any title they may have
given a writing.
12. Landlord and Tenant e=>39, 287.1
Lease agreement for commercial premises gave lessee a "license," rather than a
"lease/' as to signs identifying lessee's business on a business monument, and thus, forcible entry statute, which protected only real
property interests, did not protect lessee as
to lessor's unauthorized removal of the signs;
lease agreement did not transfer possession
°l any part of the monument to lessee, assign
an
y definite space to him, or give him exclud e possession of any space on the monume
^t, but instead simply gave him permission to place two signs on the monument.
U
-C.A.1953, 78-36-1(1, 2).

ZIMMERMAN, Justice.
Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc.,
and Dr. Robert L. Youngblood (collectively,
"Youngblood") appeal a trial court award of
treble damages against them and in favor of
Dr. Clyde B. Keller. Keller brought an action against Youngblood for trespass, conversion, and interference with prospective business advantage after Youngblood removed
two signs owned by Keller from a business
monument. Keller also argued that Youngblood violated Latah's forcible entry statute.
The trial court found that Youngblood's removal of the signs violated the forcible entry
statute and awarded Keller treble damages
under that statute. See Utah Code §§ 7836-1 & -10. On appeal, Youngblood argues
that the trial court erred in finding for Keller
on his forcible entry claim because Keller
failed to plead forcible entry in his complaint,
failed to comply with the statute's requirements, and failed to bring his claim within
the statute's one-year limitations period.
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Youngblood also argues that Keller's access
to signage space did not constitute real property and therefore was not covered by the
forcible entry statute and argues that the
trial court erred in awarding treble damages.
We modify the ruling to exclude the treble
damages award.
We first review the facts before turning to
the standard of review and our analysis. In
June of 1991, Keller leased office space from
WCJD. Ltd. ("WCJD"), to house his chiropractic business. The space leased was in
Southwood Plaza-South, an office building
that, together with Southwood Plaza-North,
forms the Southwood Medical Pavilion and
Plaza ("Medical Pavilion") in Sandy, Utah.
The Medical Pavilion has a large monument
facing the street. Under the terms of their
leases, Medical Pavilion tenants could place
signs, typically small brass plaques, on this
monument to advertise their services. The
standard lease WCJD used for SouthwoodPlaza tenants, including Keller, provided that
each tenant could put a sign on the monument but that all signs had to "be in keeping
with other signs" as to size and location.1
Keller, however, wanted a larger sign than
the other tenants because he did not have an
established practice in the area. WCJD
agreed to allow him to place a 30-inch by 60inch sign on each side of the monument,
subject to WCJD's approval of the signs.
Keller agreed to pay WCJD an additional
$50 per month for this privilege. Keller and
WCJD memorialized this agreement in an
addendum to their lease agreement.2 WCJD
later approved Keller's signs, which were
affixed to the monument with construction
adhesive.
1.

Paragraph 12 of the WCJD Lease provided:
ERECTIOS ASD REMOVAL OF SIGNS:
Tenant may place suitable signs on the Premises for the purpose of indicating the nature of
the business carried on by Tenant in the Premises; provided however, that the location and
size of such signs shall be in keeping with
other signs in the Building where Premises are
located
Tenant shall remove such signs at
the expiration ot this Lease or earlier termination thereof and repair am damage to the
Premises caused b\ such removal.

2.

The addendum provided in pertinent part:

In June of 1992, WCJD conveyed its interest in the Southwood Plaza-North building
and property, including the monument, to
Valley Bank & Trust. In October of 1992,
Valley Bank & Trust conveyed this property
to Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., a
corporation Dr. Youngblood formed for the
purpose of owning and managing this property. WCJD retained title to Southwood Plaza-South.
Shortly after the conveyance, Youngblood
spoke to Keller about his signs. Youngblood
told Keller that his signs were ''unprofessional" and that they should be removed. At this
time, Youngblood was unaware of the addendum to Keller's lease addressing the signs,
and Keller was unaware that Youngblood's
corporation owned the property on which the
monument sits. Keller did not remove the
signs.
Approximately fourteen months later.
Youngblood removed the two signs during
daylight hours and in Keller's absence but
without permission from or notice to Keller.
Keller objected, and after attempts to resolve
the problem failed, he relocated his practice
to another building.
Keller then filed suit against Youngblood
and his corporation, alleging trespass, conversion, and interference with prospective
business advantage. On June IS. 1996, Keller submitted a trial brief addressing these
issues. Two days later, Keller submitted a
supplemental trial brief, asserting for the
first time that Youngblood had violated the
forcible entry statute. On June 24, 1996.
Youngblood submitted his trial brief, addressing the merits of Keller's forcible entry
claim as well as the three original claims.
Youngblood did not object to the late asserC. Owner agrees to allow tenant to install
at tenant's our. expense and risk, two 30 inch
by 60 inch flat, non-electric signs, one on each
side of the front monument.
(a) The signs shall not interfere with an>
existing signs alread> in place.
(b) The signs must conform to any and all
State or Local code or regulation. Any
problems or costs shall be the Tenant's sole
risk and expense.
(c) The design and copy of signs must meet
with owners written approval.
(d) Tenant agrees to pay an additional
$50.00 per month for this sign space.
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tion of the forcible entry claim as outside the
pleadings, nor did he assert a statute of
limitations defense or argue that Keller
failed to comply with the forcible entry statute's requirements.
The trial court found that Youngblood's
actions constituted trespass, conversion, interference with prospective business advantage, and forcible entry, and awarded Keller
actual and punitive damages. At the close of
trial, Keller reminded the court that under
the forcible entry statute, he was entitled to
treble damage^ The court awarded treble
damages but allowed post-trial briefing and a
hearing on the treble damages issue. Following this hearing, the court reaffirmed its
treble damages award.
On appeal, Youngblood argues that the
trial court erred in finding for Keller on the
forcible entry claim because (i) Keller failed
to plead forcible entry in his complaint, (ii)
he failed to satisfy the statute's indorsement
requirements, »jd> a special one-year statute
of limitations barred recovery, and (iv) Keller's access to signage space did not constitute "real property" within the meaning of
the forcible entry statute. We address each
question in turn.
[1] Youngblood first claims that Keller's
failure to include the forcible entry claim in
his complaint bars any recover}' under Utah's
forcible entry statute. Keller responds that
the parties tried the claim by implied consent. Rule 15 b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure applies when parties try by express or implied consent issues not raised in
the pleadings. Rule 15'b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleading are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, the;, shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendments of the pleadings as may
be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any
3

- The fact thai Keller did not mo\e to amend the
Pleadings to >nciude his forcible entrv claim does
^ot make me inul court's consideration of the
Ci
aim inappropriate Rule 15(b) states that "faill e so to amjid doe* not affect the result of the
l
nal of
.>^ues ^tned b\ express or implied
consent] '* I :ah R Ci\ P. 15{b), see also Cla>k i

time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues.
Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b). "A finding of implied
consent 'depends on whether the parties recognized that an issue not presented by the
pleadings entered the case at trial.'" Domar Ocean Transp. v. Independent Refining
Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1986) (quoting Jimenez v. Tuna Vessel GRANADA 652
F.2d 415 (5th Cir.1981)). A party may give
implied consent when it does not object to
the introduction of evidence at trial. See
General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976).
However, "[w]hen evidence is introduced that
is relevant to a pleaded issue and the party
against whom the amendment is urged has
no reason to believe a new issue is being
injected into the case, that party cannot be
said to have impliedly consented to trial of
that issue." Domar Ocean Transp., 783 F.2d
at 1188.
[2] In applying rule 150)), the trial court
should assess whether the parties tried an
issue by express or implied consent. See
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah
Ct.App.1987). Once the court concludes that
the parties did, the court must treat the
issues in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. See Zions First
Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mountain /IT.. Inc., 795
P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990): Poulsen v. Poidsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 19S3).3
[3, 4] Our review of the trial court's application of rule 15(b) is a legal question that
we review for "correctness." See State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). However, because the trial court's determination
of whether the issues were tried with all
parties' "implied consent" is highly fact intensive, we grant the trial court a fairly
broad measure of discretion in making that
determination under a given set of facts. See
id. at 939.
Second Cir Ct., 741 P.2d 956, 957 (Utah 1987)
("[FJailure to mo\e to amend the pleadings to
conform to the evidence does not affect the fact
that those issues were in fact tried b\ the consent
of the parties and were therefore before the
court.").
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[5] We conclude that the trial court did
not err by addressing the forcible entry issue. The record contains substantial evidence indicating that Youngblood tried the
forcible entry claim by implied consent.
Youngblood made no objection before or during trial to the presentation of evidence related to the forcible entry issue, and both parties substantively addressed the issue in
their trial briefs. Importantly, Youngblood
reviewed Keller's supplemental trial brief
that outlined the forcible entry claim before
he submitted his trial brief. Instead of objecting to the claim as being outside of the
pleadings or barred by a defense, Youngblood addressed the claim on the merits.
And both parties addressed the issue again
during closing argument. Keller's attorney
stated:
[Youngblood] violated the forcible entry
statute.. . We have, likewise, relied on
the proposition that the removal and destruction of the sign constituted forcible
entry. And there was a suggestion in
[defendant's trial] brief . . . that the forcible entry statute does not apply. It clearly applies. It couldn't be more apropos in
this situation
There is a suggestion in
[defendant's trial] brief that somehow [the
statute] applies only to houses or enclosures. I don't read that in the statute and
I saw no case law for the proposition, nor
do I know of [any] anywhere else. It's
intended to apply to all leaseholds, property. This was property. It was a fixture
permanently affixed subject to a valid
leasehold.
4.

Assuming, arguendo, that a one-vear limitations period applies, the statute of limitations
defense fails e\en li Youngblood did not waive it
Youngblood ba>es his statute of limitations defense on the fact that more than one vear elapsed
between his removal of the sign and Keller's first
mention of the forcible entn, claim This argument, however ignores the fact thai rule 15(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
amended claims relate back to the date of the
original filing
Rule 15(c) provides that a claim asserted in an
amended pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading whenever the claim "arose out
of the conduct transaction, or occurrence set
forth
m the original pleading " Utah
R.Civ.P. 15(c) Because the parties tried the
forcible entn claim by implied consent, Keller s

Youngblood's attorney responded by arguing
that the sign was not real property, was not
a fixture, and was not permanently attached.
Because these facts are enough to support
the conclusion that Youngblood tried the
forcible entry claim by implied consent, we
find that the court properly considered this
issue.
[6, 7] In a post-trial brief, Youngblood for
the first time argued that the one-year statute of limitations of section 78-12-29(2;
barred the forcible entry claim and that the
court's failure to indorse on the summons the
number of days within which the defendant
must appear, as required by section 78-36-8
of the Code, precluded recovery under the
statute. We find that both of these defenses
were waived.
[8, 9] Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, u[a] party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present
either by motion . or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply/' Utah
R.Civ.P. 12(h). A party waives a statute of
limitations defense by failing to raise it in a
responsive pleading or by motion before submitting a responsive filing. See Staker v.
Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co., 664 P.2d
1188, 1190 (Utah 1983); Utah R.Civ.P. 120i).
Likewise, a party's failure to comply with
section 78-36-8's indorsement requirement is
a waiveable defense. See Fowler v. Seiter,
838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Because Youngblood failed to raise the statute
of limitations4 and statutory compliance defenses before he submitted a response—in
this case his trial brief—he waived those
defenses.5
complaint was amended for purposes of rule 15
Further, because the forcible entr> claim arose
out of the same conduct set forth in Keller ^
original complaint, rule 15 U applies. Accordingly, a one-\ear statute of limitations would not
bar Keller's claim because the 15(b) amendment
relates back to the filing date of Keller*s complaint. Because we find that Dr. Youngblood
waned the statute of limitations defense, we
need not decide whether a one-vear limitations
period, in fact, applies to a forcible entrv claim
5. We recognize that rule \2 of the Utah Rules o!
Ci\il Procedure can operate as an exception to
the general rule that a pan\ waives a defense b>
failing to raise it in a responsive filing Unde:
rule 15(a), a part\ ma\ amend its pleading to
assert a defense that it failed to raise in a respon-
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Moreover, Youngblood expressly waived
Because the trial court's finding of a forcthese defenses during the post-trial hearing ible entry turns on its conclusion that Keller
on the treble damages issue. Youngblood's had a valid leasehold in real property, we
must first determine if a leasehold existed.
attorney stated:
After reading [plaintiffs] memorandum on This determination is a question of law that
the issue of waiver, I'm reluctantly inclined we review for correctness. See Pena. 869
to agree that, although my predecessor P.2d at 936.
counsel certainly should have objected, he
[10] A lease "conveys an interest in land
didn't. And based upon that, I do think
and
transfers possession." 49 Am.Jur.2d
that those issues, [failure to plead forcible
Landlord
and Tenant § 21 (1995). A lease
entry, statute of limitations, and statutory
compliance] are probably waived. And so must convey a definite space and must transfer exclusive possession of that space to the
I'm not going to contest those.
lessee. See id. In contrast, a license in real
Finding that the trial court did not err in
property "is the permission or authority to
considering the forcible entry claim and that
engage in a particular act or series of acts
Youngblood waived any defenses, we now
upon the land of another without possessing
review the trial court's application of the
an interest therein," 25 Am.Jur.2d Easeforcible entry statute to the facts. Youngments and Licenses § 137 (1996), and is
blood argues that the district court erred in
"subject to the management and control refinding a forcible entry because neither Keltained by the owner." 49 Am.Jur.2d Landler's sign nor his access to signage space
lord and Tenant § 21 (1996).
constituted real property. The forcible entry
statute provides:
[11] In determining whether an instruEvery person is guilty of a forcible entry, ment creates a lease or a license, "the intenwho either:
tion of the parties as ascertained from the
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or instrument itself prevails. Id. However, a
other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimi- court is not bound by the parties' characterdation or stealth, or by any kind of vio- ization of their transaction or by any title
lence or circumstances of terror, enters they may have given a writing. 25 Am.
upon or into real property: or,
Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 137 (1996).
(2) after entering peaceably upon real
[12] We find that the lease agreement
property, turns out by force, threats or
and
the addendum gave Keller a license, not
menacing conduct the party m actual posa
leasehold
interest. First, under paragraph
session.
12 of his lease, Keller, like all other tenants,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-1 (emphasis addhad permission to place a sign on the monued). The district court made three conclument. Paragraph 12 did not transfer possessions of law pertinent to the "real property"
sion of any part of the monument to Keller,
issue. It ruled that the monument was real
did not assign any definite space to him, and
property because it "was permanently affixed
did not give him exclusive possession of any
to real property'', that Keller's lease gave
space on the monument. Further, WCJD
him "a valid and enforceable leasehold interretained management and control of the
est" m the monument; and that Keller's
monument under paragraph 12.
lease rights in the monument "constituted a
leasehold m realty." The district court then
The addendum covering Keller s signs did
concluded that Youngblood committed a forc- nothing to convert this license into a leaseible entry "in that [he] forcibly deprived hold. Instead, the addendum merely altered
Plaintiff of peaceable possession of his lease- paragraph 12's requirement that tenants
hold by self-help."
could only place signs that were "in keeping
Slv

e pleading if the part\ has lea\e of the court or
°nsent of the ad\ erse p a m See Staker v Hunttngton Cleveland In Co, 664 P 2d 1188, 1190
vutah 1983) However because Youneblood ex-

c

pressk waived his defenses in the post-trial hearing, he cannot avail himself of rule 15 to revive
his defense
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with other signs" on the monument. That is,
the addendum gave Keller a license to place
a larger sign on the monument.
[13] For the benefit of the bench and
bar, we think it useful to address whether
the forcible entry statute would apply if Keller had had a valid leasehold interest. In
other words, is a sign affixed to a structure
on real property the type of property intended to be covered by the forcible entry statute? To understand the type of property
covered by the forcible entry statute, we
briefly review its history.
[14,15] At common law, a landlord could
use self-help to forcibly enter a tenant's
premises and evict the tenant without running the risk of incurring civil liability. See
Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way
Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative
to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 759,
776 (1994). After realizing the potential for
violence that this rule of law created when a
landlord used self-help to expel a tenant,
many states passed forcible entry and detainer statutes.6 Id. Addressing the constitutionality of Oregon's forcible entry statute,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
The landlord-tenant relationship was one
of the few areas where the right to selfhelp was recognized by the common law of
most States, and the implementation of
this right has been fraught with "violence
and quarrels and bloodshed." . . . Hence,
the Oregon statute was enacted in 1866 to
alter the common law and obviate resort to
self-help and violence. The statute, intended to protect tenants as well as landlords, provided a speedy, judicially supervised proceeding to settle the possessory
issue in a peaceful manner.
Lindsey v. Norrnet 405 U.S. 56, 71-72, 92
S.Ct. 862, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972); see also
Paxton v. Fisher 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903,
906 (1935) (noting that purpose of forcible
6.

Before institution of forcible entry statutes, English common law permitted one entitled to possession of land to use an\ force reasonabh necessary—short of force threatening death or serious
bodih mjur\—to regain possession from another
wrongfully withholding the land. In 1381, England, under Richard II, passed a statute criminal-

entry statute is "to provide a speedy remedy,
summary in character, to obtain possession
of real property" and thereby prevent those
seeking possession from taking "the law into
their own hands"). Forcible entry statutes
were designed primarily to help landlords
and tenants settle disputes regarding possession and occupancy of real property. See
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d
100, 105 (1944) (Larson, J., concurring) (stating that forcible entry statute "has to do with
actions to obtain possession, or protect one in
retaining his occupancy of real property"
(emphasis added)). Thus, we conclude that
the forcible entry statute only protects types
of property that people can occupy. A sign
is not this type of real property, and therefore, the forcible entry statute does not apply
in this situation.
We hold that the trial court incorrectly
concluded Keller had a leasehold interest in
real property. Because Keller had no interest in real property, the trial erred in applying the forcible entry statute.
Judgment modified to exclude treble damages.
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C J.,
and BRYNER, Judge, concur in Justice
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion.
RUSSON, Justice, concurring in the
result:
I write separately only to express my disapproval of the majority's advisory opinion.
After concluding that the agreement and addendum gave Keller a license, not a leasehold
interest, the majority states, 'Tor the benefit
of the bench and bar, we think it useful to
address whether the forcible entry statute
would apply if Keller had had a valid leasehold interest." Because no leasehold interest
exists in this case, the issue as to whether
the forcible entry statute applies to leasehold
interests is not ripe for review. I see no
reason to depart from our sound judicial
izing the use of force to regain possession of
land In 1840, the statute was held to provide a
basis for ciul liabiht} See Gerchick, supra, at
773-75 In 1872, Utah adopted a forcible entr%
statute modeled after the English statute. Set
Compiled Laws of Utah ch. 8, § 1196 (1872
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iolicy against rendering advisory opinions.
lee Stewart v. Utah Public Sen\ Comm'n,
$5 P.2d 759, 784-85 (Utah 1994) (Howe, J.,
iissenting) (%<[I]t is not the province of this
:ourt 'to exercise the delicate power of pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases'
such as the one now before us." (quoting
Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah
1980))); Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist,
724 P.2d 960, 962 n. 1 (Utah 1986) ("This
court will not issue advisory opinions.");
Justheim v. Division of State Lands, 659
P.2d 1075, 1077 (Utah 1983) (where question
is not ripe for adjudication, court's function is
not to render advisory opinions); Black v.
Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 410-11 (Utah
1982) ("Judicial policy dictates against our
rendering an advisory opinion."); Merhish v.
H.A. Folsom & Assoc, 646 P.2d 731, 732
(Utah 19821 ("[SJtrong judicial policy against
issuing advisory opinions dictates that courts
refrain from adjudicating moot questions.");
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 504, 94 P.2d
414, 424 (1939) (refusing to address constitutionality of statute where determination not
relevant to party's rights).
Having disqualified himself, Justice Stewart does not participate herein; District
Judge Bryce K. Bryner sat.
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ing lot. The District Court, Fifth District,
Cedar City Department, J. Philip Eves, J.,
found store liable and awarded punitive damages. Store appealed after its motion for
judgment notwithstanding verdict wras denied. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.,
held that patron's failure to introduce evidence of store's relative wealth wras not fatal
to award of punitive damages.
Affirmed.
Russon, J., filed a dissenting opinion in
which Howe, J., concurred.

1. Appeal and Error 0237(5)
Judgment <3=>199(5)
Ordinarily, failure to make motion for a
directed verdict forecloses consideration of
later motion for judgment notwithstanding
verdict and any appellate review of sufficiency of evidence to support verdict.
2. Appeal and Error 0 8 6 3 , 934(1)
Supreme Court will reverse trial court's
denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict based on insufficient evidence to
support verdict only if, viewing evidence in
light most favorable to party who prevailed,
it concludes that evidence is insufficient to
support verdict.
3. Appeal and Error <S=>863

Desiree HALL, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.; Larry D.
Moss, individually; Does I-X and Roe
Corporations I-X, inclusive, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 970014.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 12, 1998.

s

Patron sued store for negligence after
he was struck by vehicle in store's icy park-

In order to prevail, party appealing denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding
verdict must marshal evidence in support of
verdict and then demonstrate that evidence
is insufficient when viewed in light most favorable to verdict.
4. Damages <S=>184
Introduction of evidence as to store's
relative wrealth was not a technical prerequisite to an award of punitive damages in patron's negligence action against store to recover for injuries sustained wThen she w7as
struck by automobile in store's icy parking
lot, where store did not challenge award on
basis of excessiveness.

